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In order to be married in Cook County, Illinois, a couple must obtain a
marriage license from the Cook County Clerk by paying a $60 marriage
license fee.2 The marriage license fee will not be waived even if the couple
applying for the license cannot afford to pay it.3
Assume a couple who desires to marry in Cook County but cannot af-
ford to pay the marriage license fee sues the county clerk arguing that the
nonwaivable fee prevents them from getting married and, therefore, vio-
lates their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
What standards would the courts apply to decide this important constitu-
tional question?
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has often addressed the issue of the
constitutionality of government fees that indigent people cannot afford to
pay. This issue has arisen in the context of people involved in both the civil
and criminal justice systems as well as government-imposed fees on partic-
1. Henry Rose is a Professor of Law at Loyola University Chicago School of Law,
25 E. Pearson, Chicago, IL 60611-2055, (312) 915-7840, hrose@luc.edu. Professor Rose
expresses appreciation to Lindsey Johnson and Fred LeBaron for research assistance and to
Heather Figus and Angelina McDaniel for production assistance.
2. Applying for a Marriage License, COOK COUNTY CLERK,
http://www.cookcountyclerk.com/vitalrecords/marriagelicenses (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
3. Interview with Kevin Crutcher, Employee, Cook County Clerk (Sept. 6, 2011).
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ipation in the electoral process and on the receipt of government services.
The most recent decision of the Supreme Court addressing this issue,
ML.B. v. S.L.J, 4 resulted in a lack of clarity about the constitutional stand-
ards to be applied to this issue. 5
The purposes of this Article are to explore the history of United States
Supreme Court decisions addressing the issue of the constitutionality of
government fees as they apply to indigent persons and to analyze the coher-
ence of the constitutional doctrine that arises from these decisions. The
principle focus of the Article will be on how this issue is resolved outside of
the criminal justice context. This Article will conclude with suggestions as
to how the courts can provide more constitutional clarity to the resolution of
this issue in the future.
II. CRIMINAL CASES
The first Supreme Court decision to address the constitutionality of a
government fee as applied to the poor was Griffin v. Illinois.6 In Grfin,
two defendants were tried together and convicted of armed robbery.7 In
order to pursue an appeal of their convictions, the defendants needed to
obtain a transcript of the trial proceedings, but they could not afford to pay
for it.8 The defendants' request for a free transcript was denied by the trial
court.9 The defendants argued the failure of the state to provide a free tran-
script prevented them from seeking appellate review of their convictions
and, therefore, violated their due process and equal protection rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 10
Justice Black, writing for three other justices in Griffin, framed the is-
sue broadly: "Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful
alike is an age-old problem. People have never ceased to hope and strive to
move closer to that goal."11 Black traced the goal of equal justice in the
administration of criminal laws back to the Magna Carta in 1215.12
Black concluded that preventing poor defendants from seeking appel-
late review of their convictions because they could not afford to pay for
transcripts violates due process and equal protection because the defendants
4. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
5. JouN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 755 (8th ed.
2010).
6. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
7. Id. at 13.
8. Id. at 13-14.
9. Id. at 15.
10. Id. at 14-15.
11. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 16.
12. Id. at 16-17.
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are discriminated against on account of their poverty. 13 He stated, "Desti-
tute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants
who have money enough to buy transcripts."'
' 4
Justice Frankfurter concurred with Justice Black that the defendants'
constitutional rights had been violated.15 However, Frankfurter asserted that
the constitutional right at issue in this case was "equal protection of the
laws."
16
In later cases, the Supreme Court extended Griffin to require the waiv-
er of court-filing fees for indigent criminal defendants in other contexts:
paying state supreme court docket and filing fees 17 and paying filing fees
for habeas corpus petitions.18 Griffin also led to the holding that a state must
provide an attorney to an indigent criminal defendant seeking to appeal a
conviction as a matter of right.19 In addition, Griffin underlaid the Supreme
Court's decision that a criminal defendant who is convicted of a crime can-
not be incarcerated beyond the statutory maximum time due to the inability
of the defendant to pay a court-imposed fine and court costs.
2 °
The Supreme Court has also determined that, unlike some rights of
criminal defendants, 2' Grffin applies to criminal defendants who are not
incarcerated as a result of their criminal convictions. In Mayer v. City of
Chicago, the Supreme Court extended Griffin to require a free appellate
transcript for an indigent defendant who had been convicted of violating
two city ordinances even though the violations were only punishable by a
fine and not by incarceration.22
II. NON-CRIMINAL CONTEXT
A. FEES FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS OR RECEIPT OF
GOVERNMENT SERVICES
The first time the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a
government-imposed fee outside the criminal law context was in Harper v.
13. Id. at 18.
14. Id. at 19.
15. Id. at 20.
16. Griffin, 351 U.S. at25.
17. Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252,258 (1959).
18. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 714 (1961).
19. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
20. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243-44 (1970).
21. For example, no indigent person can be incarcerated after conviction of a crime
unless he was offered trial counsel at a state's expense. Argensinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,
37 (1972). However, if an indigent person convicted of a crime is not sentenced to a term of
imprisonment, the failure of the state to provide counsel at trial is not a constitutional defect.
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
22. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 198 (1971).
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Virginia State Board of Elections.23 In Harper, the State of Virginia im-
posed a $1.50 poll tax on residents who desired to vote in state elections.24
The constitutionality of the poll tax was challenged by some Virginians
who could not or did not pay it.25 The Supreme Court held that such a poll
tax violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
"whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an
electoral standard., 26 The Court considered the right to vote a fundamental
right and any classification that restrained it "must be closely scrutinized
and carefully confined. 27 The Virginia poll tax was found to violate equal
protection.28
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of another govern-
ment fee that individuals could not afford to pay in Bullock v. Carter.29 In
Bullock, the plaintiffs sought to be candidates in various county primary
elections in Texas but could not afford to pay the candidate filing fees
(ranging from $1,000 to $6,300).30 As a result, they were denied places on
the ballot.3' The plaintiffs challenged, on equal protection grounds, the re-
quirement in Texas that payment of a filing fee is a prerequisite to a candi-
date's participation in a primary election. 32 The Court recognized the bur-
den of denying candidates a place on the ballot based on their inability to
pay a filing fee fell more heavily on potential candidates and voters based
on their economic status.33 As a result, the Court applied strict scrutiny in
its equal protection analysis of the fees.34 The Court concluded that Texas
failed to establish the filing fees were necessary to achieve otherwise legit-
imate objectives and, therefore, they violated equal protection of the laws. 35
In Lubin v. Panish, another case involving access to the ballot, an in-
digent person challenged a California statute that imposed a $701.60 filing
fee to place his name on the ballot in a primary election for county office.36
The plaintiff was denied nominating papers for the county office because he
was unable to pay the filing fee.37 The Court held that an electoral system
23. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
24. Id. at 668.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 666.
27. Id. at 667.
28. Harper, 383 U.S. at 670.
29. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
30. Id. at 135-36.
31. Id. at 136.
32. Id. at 141.
33. Id. at 144.
34. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144.
35. Id. at 149.
36. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
37. Id. at 711.
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that bars a candidate from the ballot solely because he cannot pay a filing
fee violates equal protection.38
The only Supreme Court decision that addresses a government-
imposed fee for the receipt of government services that an indigent person
could not pay is Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools.39 In Kadrmas, a
rural public school district in North Dakota imposed an annual fee of $97
for a child to ride the school district's buses to and from school.40 The
Kadrmas family, who lived sixteen miles from their child's school, could
not afford to pay the school bus fee, and the school district buses stopped
picking up the Kadrmas' child.41 Mrs. Kadrmas and her child sued the
school district, contending the school bus fee violated their equal protection
rights.42 The Supreme Court concluded that strict scrutiny review was not
appropriate because the poor are not a suspect class, and education is not a
fundamental right.43 The Supreme Court held there was a rational basis for
the school bus fee because requiring that all children ride free would create
a disincentive for a school district to choose to provide bus service at all
and, therefore, equal protection was satisfied.44
B. CIVIL LITIGATION FEES
In several cases, the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality
of fees in civil litigation that poor people could not afford to pay. The first
case in which this issue was addressed was Boddie v. Connecticut.45 In
Boddie, welfare recipients filed a class action challenging the state statutory
requirement that court fees totaling between $60 and $95 must be paid by
plaintiffs before their divorce cases would be heard in Connecticut state
courts. 4 6 The Supreme Court found the marital relationship involves inter-
ests that are of basic importance in our society and that the only forum au-
thorized to terminate a marriage are state courts.4 7 Given these two factors,
the Court held the imposition of fees on the filing of divorce cases violated
due process because the fees preempted the plaintiffs' right to dissolve their
marriages by the only means the state provided for doing S.
48
38. Id. at 718.
39. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
40. Id. at 454.
41. Id. at 454-55.
42. Id. at 455.
43. Id. at 458.
44. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 461-62.
45. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
46. Id. at 372.
47. Id. at 376.
48. Id. at 383.
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In United States v. Kras, the Supreme Court addressed the constitu-
tionality of a $50 filing fee that had to be paid before a petitioner could be
discharged in bankruptcy. 49 The petitioner in Kras was unable to pay the fee
due to his family's impecunious circumstances and, as a result, his bank-
ruptcy discharge was not approved. 50 The Supreme Court distinguished
Kras from Boddie, finding no constitutional interest involved in a discharge
in bankruptcy and also finding the bankruptcy process was not the only
method available to a debtor to adjust the legal relationship with his credi-
tors.5' The Court found neither a fundamental right to be involved in a
bankruptcy petition 52 nor any suspect class to be affected by the bankruptcy
process. 53 Instead, the Court found bankruptcy legislation to be in the area
of economics and social welfare, requiring only a rational justification to
satisfy equal protection.54 The Court concluded that there is a rational basis
for the bankruptcy filing fees in that they further Congress's objective that
the bankruptcy system be self-sustaining and paid for by those who use it
rather than by tax revenues drawn from the public.55
The logic of Kras was followed by the Supreme Court in Ortwein v.
Schwab.56 In Ortwein, two welfare recipients in Oregon brought appeals to
the Oregon Court of Appeals seeking judicial review of administrative deci-
sions of state welfare officials that reduced their welfare benefits.57 All ap-
pellants in the Oregon Court of Appeals were required to pay a $25 filing
fee, and both of these appellants were unable to pay the fee.58 The appel-
lants challenged the imposition of the filing fees on both due process and
equal protection grounds.5 9 The Supreme Court found that Kras, rather than
Boddie, applied because increased welfare payments do not have the consti-
tutional significance of the marital interests involved in Boddie, and the
administrative hearings conducted by the state welfare department provided
49. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
50. Id. at 438-39.
51. Id. at 443-44.
52. Id. at 444-45. The author agrees with Justice Marshall, who asserted in his dis-
sent in Kras that any indigent person who seeks adjudication of his claim of right under law
should have a right of access to the courts because the courts are the exclusive forum for the
authoritative resolution of such claims. Kras, 409 U.S. at 462-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See also Gary S. Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards,
and the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IOwA L. REv. 223, 225 (1970);
Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect
One's Rights-Part H, 1974 DUKE L.J. 527, 567 (1974).
53. Kras, 409 U.S. at 445.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 447.
56. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
57. Id. at 656-57.
58. Id. at 658.
59. Id. at 656.
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the appellants with due process.6" As in Kras, the Court found that welfare
benefits are in the area of social welfare, and the applicable equal protection
standard is rational justification. 61 The Court concluded the filing fees are
imposed to generate revenue to offset the expenses of operating the Oregon
court system and, therefore, there was a rational basis for the filing fees that
62satisfied equal protection.
Little v. Streater involved a due process challenge to a Connecticut
statute that provided that, in paternity actions, the cost of blood grouping
tests are to be borne by the party requesting them.63 The appellant was a
man against whom a paternity action was brought in Connecticut state
64court. He requested blood grouping tests be done on the mother and child
at state expense because he was indigent; the trial court authorized the tests
but denied his request that the state pay for them.65 The tests were not done
and, after trial, the appellant was found to be the child's father and was or-
dered to pay child support as well as the mother's expenses and attorney's
fees.66 The appellant contended that due process was violated when the trial
court denied his request, based on indigency, that the state pay for the blood
grouping tests.67 The Supreme Court acknowledged that blood grouping
tests can provide strong exculpatory evidence that a man is not the father of
a child.68 The Court also recognized that Connecticut was a state actor in
the paternity case because the child's mother was receiving welfare benefits
from the state, and any child support would be paid to the state. 69 Finally,
although a paternity action is a civil action, the Court found it has "'quasi-
criminal' overtones" because a man found to be a father of a child in a pa-
ternity action can be imprisoned if he fails to comply with a child support
order entered by the trial court.70 The Court considered the three factors
announced in Mathews v. Eldridge71 to determine whether due process re-
quired the blood grouping tests be paid by the state.72 After considering the
60. Id. at 659-60.
61. Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 660.
62. Id.
63. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
64. Id. at 3.
65. Id. at 3-4.
66. Id. at 4.
67. Id. at 5.
68. Little, 452 U.S. at 6-8.
69. Id. at 9.
70. Id. at 10.
71. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Mathews Court held that in
deciding procedural due process issues, courts should evaluate the private interests at stake,
the government interests, and the risk of error in the extant procedures as well as the proba-
ble value of additional procedures. Id. at 334-35.
72. Little, 452 U.S. at 13.
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Mathews factors, the Court concluded that the due process rights of the
indigent appellant were violated when the Connecticut trial court failed to
order blood grouping tests at the state's expense.73
C. ML.B. V. S.L.J.
The Supreme Court's most recent case involving a government-
imposed fee that an indigent person could not pay is ML.B. v. S.L.J. 74 In
ML.B., a mother was sued by the father of her children for termination of
her parental rights in Mississippi state court.75 After trial, the state court
judge entered a decree terminating all of the mother's parental rights.76 The
mother desired to appeal the trial court decision, but her appeal was dis-
missed because she could not afford to pay a $2,352.36 record preparation
fee.77 The mother appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, contending the deni-
al of her right to appeal within the Mississippi court system violated her
right to due process and equal protection of the laws.78
The Supreme Court in ML.B. recognized that "providing equal justice
for poor and rich" is an "age-old problem. '7 9 The Court examined the Grif-
fin line of cases that guaranteed criminal defendants waiver of fees on ap-
peals of convictions that were a matter of right. 80 This line of cases included
Mayer v. Chicago,81 in which appeal costs were waived by the Court for an
indigent criminal defendant who was convicted of violating city ordinances
that did not involve incarceration as a penalty.82 The Court followed Mayer
and held that the mother in ML.B. was constitutionally entitled to appeal
the decree terminating her parental rights without paying a fee to produce a
record.83 The Court was strongly influenced by the fact that the lower
court's decision permanently terminated M.L.B.'s relationship with her
children, and the relationship between a parent and child is constitutionally
protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion.84
The Court's reasoning in ML.B. is perplexing in several respects. The
ML.B. Court relied on the Griffin-Mayer line of cases, involving the rights
of criminal defendants, even though the Supreme Court has stated that the
73. Id. at 16-17.
74. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
75. Id. at 107.
76. Id. at 107-08.
77. Id. at 106.
78. Id. at 109.
79. ML.B., 519 U.S. at 110 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956)).
80. Id. at 110-13.
81. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
82. ML.B., 519 U.S. at 111-12.
83. Id. at 107, 111, 120-23, 125, 128.
84. Id. at 116.
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principles announced in these cases should only be applied in criminal cas-
es and not more generally. 85 Thus, the Griffin-Mayer line of cases has lim-
ited applicability outside of a criminal context to a civil case involving the
termination of parental rights.
The Court in ML.B. also recognized the Griffin-Mayer line of cases
reflects both due process and equal protection concerns. 86 However, the
Griffin-Mayer line of cases does not follow the traditional principles of
equal protection 7 and procedural due process 88 that are normally applied in
non-criminal cases. The ML.B. Court concluded the equal protection con-
cern is paramount because it focuses on "fencing out would-be appellants
based solely on their ability to pay core costs. '89 The ML.B. Court adopted
a balancing test to decide the issue before it: "[W]e inspect the character
and intensity of the individual interest at stake, on the one hand, and the
State's justification for its exaction, on the other." 90 However, this balanc-
ing test is not consistent with the normal equal protection analysis that the
Court has developed in other non-criminal cases. 91 Moreover, the precedent
that the Court in ML.B. found most persuasive, Mayer v. Chicago, rejected
a balancing of the indigent accused's interests with the state's interests.92
TV. POST-ML.B. v. S.LJ. ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT FEES AS APPLIED
TO THE POOR
In ML.B. v. S.L.J., the Supreme Court took a wrong turn in several re-
spects. It should not have followed constitutional doctrine developed in the
unique criminal law context and applied it in a civil law case. It also should
not have applied a balancing test to resolve an important constitutional is-
sue when the application of traditional equal protection doctrine would have
yielded the same result.
85. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 n.6 (1977).
86. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120.
87. In a non-criminal context, equal protection analysis focuses on several levels of
scrutiny of governmental classifications depending upon the suspectness of the groups af-
fected by the classification and whether a fundamental interest is burdened by the classifica-
tion. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,439-42 (1985).
88. In a non-criminal context, procedural due process analysis focuses on the pri-
vate interests at stake, the governmental interests, and the risk of error in extant procedures
as well as the probable value of additional procedures. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
334-35 (1976).
89. ML.B., 519 U.S. at 120.
90. Id. at 120-21.
91. See supra note 87.
92. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1971). Justice Brennan, writ-
ing for the majority in Mayer, stated that the Griffin principle does not involve a balancing
test but rather "is a flat prohibition against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an
appeal as would be available to others able to pay their own way." Id.
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The preference the Court in ML.B. stated for equal protection analysis
of government fees was appropriate because it focuses on denying people
government services based on an inability to pay a fee. It is long established
that government actions that are neutral on their face may violate equal
protection if their application disadvantages a specific group. 93 Thus, chal-
lenges on equal protection grounds to government fees that indigent people
cannot afford to pay are challenges to the fees in their application and not
on their face. Had traditional equal protection doctrine been applied in
ML.B., Mississippi would have been required to justify its mandatory rec-
ord preparation fee by establishing that it was necessary to satisfy a compel-
ling governmental interest because the child-parent relationship involves a
constitutionally protected interest. It is unlikely that Mississippi could have
met this standard.94
Some constitutional law scholars have suggested the decision in
ML.B. may represent a trend in Supreme Court decisions to apply a "bal-
ancing test" to equal protection cases involving fundamental interests. 95 If
this suggestion is true, it would be an unfortunate development in equal
protection doctrine because it would represent a diminution in the level of
scrutiny that courts apply to government classifications that burden funda-
mental rights.96
Traditional equal protection analysis of government classifications is
an effective and sensible way for courts to review government fees that
indigent people cannot afford to pay. If the fee burdens no fundamental
interest, the courts will find equal protection to be satisfied so long as the
fee is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.97 On the other
hand, if the fee does burden a fundamental interest, the fee will only be
upheld if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental inter-
est.98
93. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
94. The Court in M.L.B. recognized that Mississippi's interest in the mandatory
record preparation fee is financial: offsetting the cost of its court system. ML.B., 519 U.S. at
122. However, the Court also considered that waiving the fee would not create an undue
burden on the state because there are so few appeals of parental termination decisions in
Mississippi. Id. Moreover, while the Court recognized that imposing fees to defray the costs
of government ordinarily provides a rational basis under equal protection, it is not a suffi-
cient justification for a government fee that impinges a fundamental right. Id. at 123-24.
95. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 735-55 (8th
ed. 2010).
96. Under traditional equal protection scrutiny, courts apply strict scrutiny to gov-
ernment classifications that burden fundamental rights requiring the government to establish
that they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling government interest. City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
97. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
98. Id.
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A couple who desires to marry in Cook County, Illinois, but cannot af-
ford to pay the $60 marriage license fee and, as a result, are denied a mar-
riage license could challenge the denial in court on equal protection
grounds. Since marriage involves constitutionally protected interests, 99 the
courts should provide strict scrutiny and require Cook County to establish
that the marriage license fee is necessary to satisfy a compelling govern-
ment interest. It is unlikely that Cook County could meet this burden, and
the courts would likely conclude that the marriage license fee is unconstitu-
tional as applied to the poor.
If Cook County, Illinois, requires residents to pay a fee to play golf on
a county golf course and a resident cannot afford the fee, the fee could also
be challenged on equal protection grounds. However, since playing golf
does not involve a constitutionally protected interest, courts would only
require that the fee be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
Raising revenue to fund county government would undoubtedly constitute a
rational basis that satisfies equal protection.
There may be one circumstance in which due process might invalidate
a government fee when equal protection would not. If an indigent person
has been involuntarily summoned to court as a defendant in a civil case and
a government fee in the case prevents the defendant from mounting a de-
fense, due process may invalidate the fee even if no fundamental interest is
at stake. If the defendant could convince the court that weighing the factors
announced in Mathews v. Eldridge100 led to the conclusion that the fee bar-
rier prevented the defendant from receiving a meaningful opportunity to be
heard in the case, then due process would be violated. l '
V. CONCLUSION
An important constitutional issue is, when does the Fourteenth
Amendment require that government fees be waived for indigent persons
who cannot afford to pay them? The Supreme Court has addressed this is-
sue in many contexts. As a result of its most recent decision on this issue,
ML.B., the constitutional standards for deciding this issue are uncertain.
The author believes that, in the large majority of cases that raise this issue,
the multiple levels of scrutiny involved in traditional equal protection anal-
99. ML.B., 519 U.S. at 116.
100. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
101. This scenario tracks Little v. Streator, 452 U.S. 1 (1981). In Little, the defendant
was sued in a paternity case in which he denied being the father of the child. The defendant
could not afford to pay for blood grouping tests that might establish that he is not the father.
After considering the Mathews factors, the Court in Little held that it violated due process
for the state to not pay for the tests because, without them, the defendant was denied a mean-
ingful opportunity to be heard. Little, 452 U.S. at 16; Mathews, 424 U.S. 319.
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ysis will coherently resolve the issue for the poor and for the government
entities who seek to charge them a fee.
